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Abstract
The Internet has been ascribed a prominent role in collective action, particularly with 
widespread use of social media. But most mobilisations fail. We investigate the characteristics 
of those few mobilisations that succeed and hypothesise that the presence of ‘starters’ with low 
thresholds for joining will determine whether a mobilisation achieves success, as suggested by 
threshold models. We use experimental data from public good games to identify personality 
types associated with willingness to start in collective action. We find a significant association 
between both extraversion and internal locus of control, and willingness to start, while 
agreeableness is associated with a tendency to follow. Rounds without at least a minimum level 
of extraversion among the participants are unlikely to be funded, providing some support for the 
hypothesis.
Background: online collective action and leadership
The third millennium has begun with many prominent examples of collective action worldwide, 
from the uprisings against dictatorships in the so-called ‘Arab spring’ of 2011, to widespread 
mobilisation against liberal democratic governments in the aftermath of the financial crash and 
crisis of 2008. Widespread use of the internet, with its capacity to reduce the costs of 
participation, dissemination and organisation, has often been cited as a contributing factor. Use 
of the internet seems to be related to political activism even when controlling for prior social or 
attitudinal characteristics of Internet users such as age, education and civic duty (Norris, 2009, 
p. 135) and interest in politics (Borge and Cardenal, 2009). A growing number of scholars argue 
that the availability of Internet-based platforms challenges long-standing conventional wisdom 
about the limits and barriers to mass political participation (Lupia and Sin, 2003; Bimber et al., 
2006, 2008, 2012; Bennett and Segerberg, 2012, 2013), particularly through the facilitation of 
huge online gatherings of people who do not know each other, and who have carried out small 
participatory actions, such as signing an e-petition or raising the profile of a demonstration 
through endorsement or notification on a social media site. The low cost of these acts would 
mean that they appear low down on any ‘ladder’ or scale of political participation (Arnstein, 
1969; Almond and Verba, 1961; Parry et al, 1992), but they clearly fall within the category of 
collective action geared at the securing of public goods. And some large-scale mobilisations of 
these ‘micro-donations’ of resources have brought new political issues to public attention and 
even achieved the ultimate goal of policy change. For example, in the UK a handful of petitions 
submitted to the No 10 Downing Street e-petitions site obtained over a million signatures,1 one 
of which was officially recognised as playing a part in reversing the government’s policy plans 
to introduce road pricing.
Even in this golden age for collective action, however, most attempts to mobilise 
collective action around public goods fail, while only a few succeed. For every successful 
demonstration, petition, or sustained collective action for policy change, there are many more 
campaigns for similar issues that have barely left the ground, never obtaining critical mass or 
success by any criteria. The collection of transactional data from 8,000 electronic petitions to the 
UK government (shown in Figure 1 below) shows that 95 per cent fail to attain even the 500 
signatures necessary for an official response, a modest criterion for success. Use of the Internet 
for collective action increases the ratio of unsuccessful to successful collective initiatives. Low 
1 The site collected more than 8 million signatures from over 5 million unique email addresses 
from 2009 to 2011, see http://www.mysociety.org/projects/no10-petitions-website/
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start-up costs mean that mobilisations that in offline environments would have failed to get off 
the ground may achieve some sort of presence, but quickly wither away. 
So what are the characteristics of the very few mobilisations that succeed? In the offline 
world, the success of political mobilisation was often ascribed to the existence of effective 
leaders; people or organisations that overcome the co-ordination problems of an interest group 
or community by organizing and initiating action (Calvert, 1992). Leaders identify public goods 
and common goals to pursue; they mobilise collective resources such as time, money and 
organisation; and they create and reinforce collective trust, group identity and cohesion 
(Colomer, 2011, p. 55), providing selective incentives for individual acts of participation. 
However, Internet-based platforms drastically reduce the costs of these activities, particularly 
co-ordination and dissemination, and minimise the cost of individual participatory acts, 
diminishing the need for collective trust, group cohesion, or selective incentives. Although there 
have been some claims that charismatic new 'cyberchiefs' will replace traditional leaders and 
play an increasingly important role in bringing together 'online tribes' (O'Neil, 2009: 43) with 
collective goals, the majority of work in this field has focused on the idea that ‘formal 
organisations with structures and incentives are no longer critical’ for collective action (Bimber 
et al., 2012, p. 4-5; Benkler, 2006; Shirky, 2008; Bimber et al., 2005; Bimber et al., 2008, 
Flanagin et al., 2006). Even those scholars who argue for bringing the relevance of formal 
organisation back into contemporary conceptualisation of collective action (particularly Bimber 
et al., 2012), or that online social networks are replacing organisations in analyses of collective 
action, in a new ‘logic of connective action’ (Bennett and Segerberg, 2012) see a general shift of 
agency from leaders and elites to members or individuals; ‘the flow of almost all innovation in 
digital media at present is in the same direction, as power is shifted from centers to ends’  
(Bimber et al., 2012, p. 20).
In this paper we follow this line of argument in assuming that leaders in the traditional 
sense are less important online, but focus on one aspect of leadership that we hypothesise will 
still be important for sustainable collective action: the existence of a number of people who are 
willing to undertake the (low-cost) action of joining early when there are few signals of the 
mobilisation’s viability or that other people will participate, but who do not necessarily need to 
be willing to undertake co-ordination or organisation costs, or be well resourced in terms of time 
or money, or be charismatic. The petition data presented in Figure 1 below provide some 
evidence for this claim; the number of signatures a petition gets in the first day was among the 
most important factors in predicting whether the petition will eventually succeed (Hale, 
Margetts, and Yasseri 2013), suggesting that the existence of a certain number of people willing 
to start a mobilisation at the point when there has been no media coverage, no time for formal 
organisation to play much of a role, and no reassuring evidence of other substantive support, are 
essential to viability. Such individuals may be labelled ‘starters’, or at the most ‘initiators’, 
rather than ‘leaders’, because they perform none of the other actions associated with leaders of 
interest groups. 
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Figure 1. Petitions submitted to No.10 Downing St. E-petitions Site, Sept. 2009 - May 2010
Source: Data from No.10 Downing Street E-petitions site, Sept 2009 to May 2010 (N= 8,326  
petitions)
Having identified starters as the new leaders, we assume further that they will have 
distinctive individual-level characteristics which we aim to investigate, just as earlier studies 
have endeavoured to identify the characteristics of effective leaders in offline settings, for 
example in terms of charismatic leadership and the leadership styles most likely to engender co-
operation (see Judge et al., 2002 for a review). We use experimental data to investigate the 
characteristics of those people who are likely to join a mobilisation on the critical first day. We 
use previous work on the characteristics associated with leaders as a starting point for 
identifying those people most likely to join when there are few other participants, while 
assuming that not all of them will be relevant to this one activity. We focus on personality as a 
potential influence on individual behaviour in this regard, following other political scientists 
who have found personality to be ‘comparable to demographics and fundamental political 
predispositions’ (Mondak and Halperin, 2008: 360). The first section below identifies some 
previous research into individual thresholds for joining mobilisations, while the second section 
draws together research on leadership that might provide a clue to the personality of those 
individuals willing to ‘start’ online mobilisations, allowing us to build three hypotheses. The 
third section presents the experimental design and results, while the fourth section applies these 
results to each of the hypotheses developed in the earlier sections and discusses the research and 
policy implications of the findings. 
Starters, followers and threshold effects
What characterises starters, the people who are willing to join in the absence of other 
participants? The clue to identifying differential willingness to join at the start of a mobilisation 
might come from much earlier work on thresholds in collective behaviour. Schelling (2005) in 
his 1978 book Micromotives and Macrobehaviour developed a model of mobilisation, although 
not for a political context. He assumed that people have different thresholds for joining a 
mobilisation—that is, some will join when the number expected to join is low; most will join 
where the number expected to join is in the middle; and only a few will hold back and join only 
after the number expected to join is high. He argued that where such thresholds are normally 
3
distributed, there will be an S-shaped joining curve for any mobilisation, illustrated in its 
simplest form in Figure 2 with the number of people that will join plotted against the number 
that are expected to join. He produces a variety of models from this basic form, showing how 
sometimes the mobilisation curve will cross the diagonal line, in a tipping point where the 
number of people expected to participate meets the threshold of most people, and the 
mobilisation will succeed. In other situations, where the curve does not rise above the line, the 
mobilisation will fail. Similarly, Granovetter (1978; 1983) identified the concept of threshold as 
key to the viability of collective behaviour, arguing that the distribution of thresholds was a vital 
determinant of outcomes. 
The threshold model suggests individual behavioural disposition doesn’t change before, 
during and after collective decisions are made; these are contingent dispositions that act on the 
situation, even if actual behaviour may change. But there is no attempt to identify the origins of 
these dispositions; neither Schelling nor Granovetter ‘consider how individuals happen to have 
the preferences that they do’ (Granovetter, 1978, p. 1421). In contrast, the aim of this research is 
to investigate empirically the distribution of thresholds, focusing on the characteristics of the 
group of starters who are willing to join early. 
Figure 2. Schelling’s participation curve
In online mobilisations, Schelling’s ‘number expected’ is replaced with the ‘social 
information’ that most electronic interfaces provide, that is, an indication of the number of other 
participants there have been involved in an e-petition, a mass email campaign, a Facebook group 
or a collection for charity. Although not all sites provide this information, most do, and social 
media such as social networking sites or micro-blogging sites have such information built into 
their design. So although Schelling makes the questionable assumption that the ‘Number 
expected’ figure is readily available, it may be that for the first time, his assumptions are easily 
met. Here, we use our data to test his claims, leading to our first hypothesis:
H1: When observing propensity to join mobilizations among a pool of potential participants in 
collective action, we will be able to identify individuals who will consistently join mobilizations 
early, when there are no signals of viability.
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Personality and thresholds
Our aim here is to investigate whether people with particular personalities display a different 
propensity to join early or late, testing the hypothesis that personality types, as stable attributes 
of human psychology, are likely to predispose an individual to different timings of collective 
action. This aim links to recent work in political science on the impact of personality upon other 
kinds of political behaviour and beliefs (see Mondak and Halperin, 2008; Mondak, 2010; 
Mondak et al., 2010, 2011; Gerber et al., 2010, 2011; Gallego and Oberski, 2012), following an 
earlier development in economics and a much longer tradition and central role in psychology. 
Researchers from different academic disciplines tend to use different categorisations of 
personality. Here we borrow three typologies: one from economics (social value orientation); 
one from political science (the ‘Big 5’ personality traits), and one from psychology (locus of 
control), allowing us to construct three hypotheses as to what personality types would be most 
likely to be associated with starting a mobilisation. Previous research on leadership and 
personality provides no clear picture of how personality traits relate to leadership: ‘traditional 
and contemporary research shows that personality cannot explain leadership’ (Andersen, 2006); 
and ‘results of investigations relating personality traits to leadership have been inconsistent and 
often disappointing’ (Judge et al., 2002, p. 765). For this reason, we select three alternative 
typologies of individual-level difference rather than selecting one typology (for which we could 
have no unequivocal justification), to maximise our chances of identifying the characteristics of 
those willing to ‘start’ online mobilisations. 
Locus of Control: In the field of organisational and applied psychology, internal locus of control
—the extent to which people believe that they have control over their own fate—has been 
identified as an important personality trait with respect to all kinds of social roles, including 
leadership. Developed by Rotter (1966) into a measurable scale (later shortened by Carpenter 
and employed in Carpenter and Seki, 2006), locus of control identifies ‘internals’, who are those 
people who believe that they are masters of their fate and perceive a strong link between their 
actions and consequences, and ‘externals’, and who do not believe themselves as having direct 
control of their fate and perceive themselves in a passive role with regard to the external 
environment. In work settings, internal locus of control has been positively associated with 
favourable work outcomes and greater job motivation (Ng et al., 2006), high job satisfaction and 
performance (Judge et al., 2002), and more effective leadership (Spector, 1982). In business 
studies and management research, people with internal locus of control have been identified as 
more likely to be leaders and are associated with superior leadership performance (Anderson 
and Schneier, 1978), although Judge et al. (2002) found locus of control to be a weaker 
predictor of successful leaders than other personality traits reviewed. In economics, Boone et al. 
(1999) find that ‘internals’ in social dilemma situations are more likely than ‘externals’ to play 
so as to try to influence the behaviour of other players to achieve their goals, while externals 
behaved less strategically. With particular relevance for this study, locus of control has been 
associated with the tendency for people to exert active control over the environment (Ng et al., 
2006); propensity to participate in social action (Gore and Rotter, 1963); and political activism 
(Carlson and Hyde, 1980; Guyton, 1988; Milbraith and Goel, 1977).
H2a: ‘Starters’ have a higher internal locus of control than ‘followers’ 
Social value orientation: In economics, the typology of individual difference most akin to 
personality that is frequently used is that of social value orientation, a measure of personal 
values. Social value orientation has been used particularly extensively in laboratory experiments 
involving public goods and co-operation games (Fischbacher et al., 2001; Keser and van 
Winden, 2000) and, more recently, field experiments in which subjects are provided with 
varying levels of information about the participation of others (Frey and Meier, 2004; Shang and 
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Croson, 2009). This work has shown that people ‘differ strongly in their contribution 
preferences’ (Fishbacher and Gächter, 2010) and identified categorisations which develop the 
simple distinction between individualistic and co-operative (see Suleiman and Rapoport, 1992; 
Weimann, 1994; Fischbacher et al., 2001; Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010) to identify some 
participants as ‘strong free riders’, some as ‘reciprocators’ and some as ‘conditional co-
operators’. In general, these investigations have focused on what effect people’s social value 
orientations have on their preferences for a leader (de Cremer, 2000), and which social value 
orientation makes for the best leaders and most effective mobilisations (Gachter et al., 2010), 
rather than effect of social value orientation on willingness to act as leaders. But a range of 
research showing that pro-social individuals are more likely to undertake the costs of 
participation (e.g. Cameron et al, 2006; van Vugt et al, 1995), suggests the following hypothesis 
with respect to willingness to start such mobilisations:
H2b: ‘Starters’ will have a more co-operative (pro-social) social value orientation than 
followers
‘Big 5’ personality traits: Finally, in the recent revival of interest in personality as a predictor of 
political behaviour, political scientists have made use of the ‘Big 5’ personality traits, which 
have been foundational in psychological studies (Wiggins, 1996; John and Srivastava, 1999: 
121) and for which a measurement instrument has been developed for situations where very 
short measures are needed (Gosling et al., 2003). Psychologists have reached a working 
consensus that these personality traits can be comprehensively conceptualised and reliably 
measured (Gerber et al., 2010: 111) and are stable over time (Tickle et al., 2001). When used in 
political science, they have been shown to be significant predictors of political attitudes and 
propensity to participate, such as turnout (Gerber et al., 2010; Mondak and Halperin, 2008). The 
‘Big 5’ personality factors comprise openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, 
and neuroticism. Openness refers to people who are inventive and curious rather than cautious; 
conscientiousness is about being self-disciplined and efficient rather than easy-going or careless; 
extraversion is about being outgoing and energetic rather than shy or reserved, and extraverted 
people have positive emotions and wish to seek stimulation in the company of others; 
agreeableness describes people who are friendly and compassionate rather than cold or unkind; 
and emotional stability describes even-temperedness and contrasts with a neurotic temperament 
and anxiety. 
From the findings of this political science research, extraversion emerges as the strongest 
predictor of participation in collective action, particularly group-oriented tasks and social forms 
of political activity. Mondak and Halperin (2008) found that extravert personalities were 
consistently associated with higher propensity to participate in politics, a finding verified by 
Gerber et al (2011), although only with forms of political activity that involve interacting with 
others, rather than donation to campaigns, for example. For all the other Big 5 traits, results are 
mixed. Openness to experience has been positively associated with some participatory acts 
(Mondak, 2010), and this finding has been replicated with non-U.S. samples (Mondak et al, 
2011; Vecchione and Caprara, 2009) but not other US samples (Gerber et al, 2011). Inconsistent 
effects have also been reported for agreeableness, indicating the importance of context for this 
variable (Gerber et al, 2011). Mondak and Halperin (2008), Mondak et al (2010) and Gerber et 
al (2011) found that agreeableness was negatively associated with some types of participation 
(electoral politics) and positively associated with others (such as attending meetings and signing 
petitions); Volk et al (2011) found that agreeableness was indicative of greater preference for 
co-operation; while Vecchione and Caprara (2009) found no results for agreeableness. 
Conscientiousness has been associated with performance in the workplace (Mondak et al, 2011, 
215), but has largely been shown to have no effect on civic engagement; Mondak and Halperin 
(2008) and Gerber et al (2011) found no consistent pattern for conscientiousness, while Mondak 
et al (2011) found that the association with participation switched from positive for community 
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engagement to negative for participation in protest activity. Finally, mixed results have been 
found for the association of emotional stability and political participation. Null results were 
reported by Parkes and Razavi (2004) and Vecchione and Caprara (2009); Mondak and Halperin 
(2008) and Gerber et al. (2011) found a positive relationship between emotional stability and 
some forms of participation, but Mondak et al (2010) found negative associations. 
From psychology, research investigating the relationship between leadership and the 
‘Big 5’ personality traits has direct relevance to our interest in people’s propensity to ‘start’ or 
‘initiate’ action, rather than merely to participate. That work looks at two broad categories of 
leadership: leadership emergence and leadership effectiveness (Lord et al., 1986), the latter 
being less relevant to the current study. Although much of that work focuses on leaders in the 
sense of other people’s views of the potential leader, rather than the ‘starter’ criteria that we are 
interested in here, and some researchers have dismissed trait theory as obsolete in this context 
(Conger and Kanungo, 1998), two extensive and detailed reviews of leadership research (Lord et 
al., 1986; Judge et al., 2002) find evidence to suggest that the ‘Big 5’ typology ‘is a fruitful basis 
for examining the dispositional predictors of leadership’ (Judge et al., 2002, p. 773). Of the ‘Big 
5’ characteristics, extraversion in particular has been positively associated to self and peer 
ratings of leadership (Gough, 1990; Judge et al., 2002). In their meta-analysis of leadership and 
personality research, Judge et al. (2002, p. 773) found that ‘Extraversion emerged as the most 
consistent correlate of leadership’, particularly with respect to leader emergence, although there 
were some findings for conscientiousness and openness to experience. For these reasons, we test 
all the ‘Big 5’ personality traits, while hypothesizing that extraversion will be the most 
important and the most likely to lead to a positive association. 
H2c: ‘Starters’ will be people scoring highly on the personality trait of ‘extraversion’, while 
‘followers’ will score lowly on extraversion.
The testing of these hypotheses (1 and 2a-c) should enable us to identify those 
personality types associated with low thresholds for joining a mobilisation. Finally, we make a 
hypothesis with respect to the composition of potential participants. If Schelling is right, then 
the existence of a sufficient number of starters, people who are willing to contribute early, will 
be crucial to the survival of a mobilisation. If thresholds are normally distributed in a 
population, then there will be a small number of people with low thresholds to make the crucial 
first steps, which then encourage other people with higher thresholds to join. If our previous 
analysis has identified personality traits that can be associated with threshold, then having at 
least one or two individuals in a group with those personality traits will be crucial to its success, 
leading to our third hypothesis: 
H3: There will be a positive association between the success of a mobilisation and the number of  
individuals with low joining thresholds.
Research Design
To test these hypotheses we use data from a one-shot public goods game laboratory experiment 
undertaken by the authors (Margetts, et al. 2013). Such an environment offers a viable way to 
explore the hypotheses detailed above because of the unique capability for theory testing   
(Morton and Williams 2010, Bardsley et al 2010), in spite of the well-known external validity 
problems of laboratory experiments when compared with field experiments (Levitt and List 
2007a, 2007b). As noted above, the online environment lowers resource barriers to participation 
(Bimber et al, 2006; 2008; 2012). In such a context, individual level factors such as personality 
and social value orientation (which are much easier to measure in a laboratory setting where a 
post-experiment questionnaire may be administered) are likely to come to the fore, in 
determining why people engage, and contextual factors (which pose particular design and 
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measurement issues in simulated laboratory settings) are less important.2 So it may be that 
online participation can be more successfully measured in a laboratory experiment than its 
offline equivalent. However, it is important to address the external validity challenges of 
laboratory experiments, doing whatever we can to mitigate them through our research design, as 
detailed below.
In the experiment, 186 subjects were provided with a number of local ‘public goods’ 
scenarios and asked to contribute tokens to the collective good in a series of 28 ‘rounds’, which 
they played anonymously in small groups (7-10), randomly allocated and changing for each 
round. All subjects were given 10 tokens at the start of each round and shown a public goods 
scenario (see appendix for scenarios and instructions to subjects). Each round a provision point 
was set at 60 per cent of the maximum, total possible contribution of all subjects in the group. If 
reached, an additional payout would be made. The payoffs for alternative strategies were clearly 
laid out; subjects would benefit most if they were to free-ride (i.e. contribute no tokens) and the 
provision point was met; and least if they were to contribute all their tokens and the provision 
point was not met. Even contributing all of one’s tokens but meeting the provision point resulted 
in a higher payoff than not contributing any tokens but not meeting the provision point. Subjects 
were told they would be paid for one, randomly-selected round. This design has been shown to 
impel subjects to treat each round as if it were the only one (Bardsley, 2000). In this paper we 
report only those rounds where they were provided with social information in real-time about 
the number of other participations who had contributed tokens; each subject took part in 
between seven and fourteen of these ‘social information’ rounds. Each round was planned to last 
50 seconds, but if there was activity in the final five second, the time was extended an additional 
five seconds to avoid deadline effects. We used standard questionnaires (see Appendix A) to 
collect personality information on the personality characteristics outlined above (locus of 
control, social value orientation and the ‘Big 5’ personality traits) after the experiment ended. 
We test our hypotheses by examining the relationship between personality and the order 
in which subjects participated in each round by contributing tokens. We use just those rounds 
where participants were aware of how many others in their group had contributed and whether 
they were leading or following at the precise moment where they decided to participate, thereby 
using the number of other participants as a surrogate for ‘number expected’ in Schelling’s 
model. We look at the rank (1st, 2nd, 3rd and so on) at which individuals contribute, looking for 
consistent patterns in the rank at which they join mobilisations to identify thresholds and then 
examining the relationship between personality and threshold. We also examine the relationship 
between the propensity of a round to get funded, and the distribution of personality 
characteristics across the people in the group playing that round. 
Results
Identifying thresholds
First, we tested H1 by looking at the propensity of individual subjects to contribute tokens in the 
early stages, when there was little or no evidence that others were participating. We examined 
the minimum, median and mean rank at which subjects participated in a round as their threshold 
for participation, and the distribution of all three is shown in Figure 3. First, with respect to 
minimum rank, if an individual subject has a minimum rank of 1, it indicates that they are 
willing to start a mobilisation with no other participants, whereas if their minimum rank across 
the 28 rounds is 5, then a higher threshold is suggested. Figure 3a shows the distribution of 
minimum rank across our subjects, showing that just over half of them were willing to ‘start’ at 
some point. This result was quite surprising, suggesting a far from normal distribution of 
people’s willingness to start a mobilisation. To identify threshold, however, we need to identify 
consistent starters, rather than just people who are willing to start at some point. Therefore, 
second, we look at median rank, and the results are shown in Figure 3b. Here the figures are 
2 We are grateful to an anonymous referee of an earlier version of this article for this point.
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more evenly distributed, with a few subjects starting often (and therefore having a median rank 
of 1 or 2), a few almost always joining only at the end of the mobilisation, and most being 
somewhere in between. The most common median rank is 3, suggesting people who are most 
likely to contribute when over 25 per cent (two out of eight, the most common group size) have 
already done so. Third, Figure 3c shows the results for mean rank, showing again a distribution 
that appears normal and fails all tests for non-normality. 
Figure 3. Distribution of subjects’ minimum, median and mean ranks and distribution of  
the number of times subjects started a round
Finally, we construct a variable to count the number of times a subject starts a round 
(propensity to start) normalised by the number of rounds the subject played. This variable 
exhibits an extremely skewed distribution (Figure 3d) with just under half of the participants 
never starting a round, and for whom the ‘propensity to start’ variable is therefore zero. Of those 
subjects who do start a round at some point (i.e. who have a value of one or greater and by 
consequence a minimum rank of one), the distribution is still right-skewed, with most 
individuals only starting one or two rounds.3 
3 Skewness ranges between 1.015 and 1.05 depending on the method used from the three 
specified in Joanes and Gill (1998).
9
Figure 4: Average rank and standard deviation of rank per subject
Note: The best fit line is a locally weighted scatterplot smoothing (LOWESS) line 
with a 95% confidence interval shaded around the line. 
Each subject played between seven and fourteen rounds in the conditions investigated 
here. We calculate the standard deviation of each subject’s ranks across these rounds as a 
measure of their consistency. Plotting this standard deviation score against the average rank of 
each participant (Figure 4) shows that nearly all subjects with a low or high average rank 
consistently contributed early or late. In contrast, while some subjects with an average rank 
towards the middle also had a low standard deviation score, other subjects were much less 
consistent and had higher standard deviation scores. Standard deviations for subjects with a 
mean rank between 4 and 6 ranged from 0.488 to 3.827 with a mean deviation of 2.276 across 
subjects. These distributions show that the subjects have heterogeneous propensities to start or 
join a collective action. It confirms H1 by showing that a few people have consistently low 
thresholds for joining, and some have consistently high thresholds. There is greater variability in 
subjects going near the middle (mean standard deviation of 2.276 for subjects with a mean rank 
between 4 and 6), but early movers and late movers act more consistently.4 
Linking thresholds to personality
The analysis above has identified four possible ways to identify the threshold for individual 
subjects: Minimum rank; Median rank; Mean rank; and Propensity to Start (a count of number 
of times contributing first). All four of these measures exhibit variance across subjects, 
supporting hypothesis H1a. Before we could examine the relationship between these threshold 
measures and personality, we first examined the personality variables in our dataset for 
collinearity, the results of which are shown in Table 1. These results show that in general the 
variables are not highly correlated; even the correlations of 0.34 and 0.35 between Rotter score 
(the variable used to measure internal locus of control) and three of the ‘Big 5’ variables 
(Extravert, Open, and Emotionally Stable) are not problematic. Nonetheless, we ran separate 
regressions for the ‘Big 5’ and Rotter score when testing our hypotheses and they are shown in 
separate tables below (see Figures 6a, b). 
4 Subjects with a mean rank greater than six have a mean standard deviation of 1.796. Subjects 
with a mean rank less than or equal to four have a standard deviation of 1.666.
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Table 1. Correlation matrix for personality measures
Extravert Agreeable
Consci-
entious
Emotionally 
Stable Open
Rotter 
Score Pro-self Pro-social
Extravert 1.00
Agreeable 0.19 1.00
Conscientious -0.06 0.02 1.00
Emotionally 
Stable 0.29 0.20 0.29 1.00
Open 0.31 0.00 0.02 -0.01 1.00
Rotter Score 0.34 0.05 0.20 0.34 0.35 1.00
Pro-self -0.18 0.10 0.06 0.01 0.04 -0.08 1.00
Pro-social 0.11 -0.11 -0.05 -0.02 -0.10 0.09 -0.89 1.00
We ran tobit regressions to test the association between the threshold measures and the 
various personality traits discussed above, in order to test hypotheses H2a, H2b and H2a, and these 
results are shown in Table 2.5 We tested for possible associations between demographic 
variables (income, age and ethnicity) and propensity to start, but none were found to be 
significant. In all regressions we controlled for the relative importance of the scenario at hand 
(as asked in the post-experiment questionnaire) for our subjects, as clearly the importance 
ascribed to an issue will be an important factor in the motivation of an individual to participate.6 
First, we found locus of control, the personality variable most often associated with 
leadership in the psychology and management literature to be significantly associated with 
going early in mobilisations. The locus of control variable was a predictor of median rank, mean 
rank, minimum rank, and propensity to start (Table 2a) across subjects. So H2a is confirmed, 
although as in some earlier work (Judge, 2002), locus of control was found to have a weaker 
effect than some of the other personality traits we investigated.  
Second, we found no significant association between threshold and social value 
orientation, the most consistent predictor of contribution amount and susceptibility to social 
information in our previous analysis (Margetts, et al. 2013). Neither ‘pro-self’ nor ‘pro-social’ 
individuals were more or less likely to start or follow other subjects. So H2b is rejected and we 
exclude social value orientation from the rest of the analysis.
Third, we found significant results for two of the ‘Big 5’ personality traits, identified in 
recent political science research as important predictors of political behaviour. Across our 
measures of threshold, we found that ‘extraversion’ was consistently associated with going 
early, and ‘agreeableness’ was consistently associated with going late. Table 2b shows agreeable 
people as being strongly associated with higher median ranks and higher mean ranks, and lower 
propensity to start. Extraversion is also an important personality variable. Extravert people have 
a higher median rank (significant to 0.05), and a higher mean rank (significant to 0.02), and they 
are significantly more likely to have a high number of starts (significant to 0.001). None of the 
other ‘Big 5’ personality traits have a significant effect on these ‘threshold’ variables. These 
results confirm Hypothesis 2a with respect to extraversion, with the additional finding for 
agreeableness, which has a consistently higher coefficient than those for extraversion.
5 We use double-sided tobit because the dependent variable is censored. Participants cannot give 
less than zero tokens or more than 10 tokens in any round. Thus the sum of a participant’s 
contributions have a floor and ceiling.
6 The post-experiment questionnaire included questions on whether the subject agreed with the 
issue, and how important they considered it to be. Both were significant but as they were 
correlated, we controlled for importance as it had the most predictive strength.
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Table 2. Tobit regressions showing relationships between threshold measures & 
personality traits
a. Rotter Score
Rank
Average Median Minimum Propensity to start
Mean 
Importance -3.168* -3.793* -5.211* 0.115
(1.34) (1.65) (2.54) (0.21)
Rotter Score -2.226* -3.065** -5.674** 0.421**
(0.92) (1.14) (1.81) (0.15)
Constant 8.853*** 9.673*** 8.036*** -0.333
(1.15) (1.41) (2.18) (0.19)
N 177 177 177 177
∗p<0.05, ∗∗p<0.01,∗∗∗ p<0.001
b. ‘Big 5’ Personality Traits
Rank
Average Median Minimum Propensity to start
Mean 
Importance -3.649** -4.164* -5.454* 0.155
(1.29) (1.62) (2.45) (0.20)
Extravert -1.788** -2.073** -3.428** 0.276**
(0.61) (0.78) (1.20) (0.10)
Agreeable 3.063*** 2.936** 5.715*** -0.606***
(0.71) (0.90) (1.44) (0.12)
Conscientious -0.154 -0.421 0.665 -0.033
(0.79) (1.00) (1.60) (0.12)
Emotionally 
Stable -0.166 -0.221 -0.635 0.186
(0.63) (0.80) (1.25) (0.10)
Open 0.394 0.240 0.238 0.214
(0.88) (1.12) (1.72) (0.14)
Constant 6.477*** 7.253*** 2.224 -0.086
(1.27) (1.61) (2.43) (0.20)
N 180 180 180 180
∗p<0.05, ∗∗p<0.01,∗∗∗ p<0.001
Conditions for successful mobilisation
If successful mobilisations rely on a number of people with low thresholds, and if these people 
are those with extravert personalities (or high internal locus of control), then it should be that 
rounds without people with one or other of these personality types will consistently fail, as 
hypothesised in H3. To test H3 we collapsed data at round level, looking at the maximum, 
minimum and mean scores for internal locus of control, extraversion and locus of control in 
each round and the relationship between these variables and whether a round was funded or not; 
that is, whether the provision point was met.
We ran regressions for all personality variables separately while controlling for the mean 
importance of all participants on the team to the scenario at hand (as above) and the amount of 
the first contribution. Basically, the higher the importance ascribed to the issue across the group 
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of participants, the more likely it is to be supported. The amount of the first contribution in a 
round is also significant, reaffirming results of previous experimental research in economics 
investigating conditional co-operation in charitable giving (see Shang and Croson, 2009). We 
control for these two variables in the regressions that follow. 
Table 3: Round level regressions
Funded
First 
Contribution 3.306*** 3.310***
(0.73) (0.77)
Mean 
Importance 4.051* 4.450*
(1.72) (1.75)
Mean Extravert 5.581*
(2.79)
Min Extravert 4.691**
(1.47)
Constant -9.856*** -7.969***
(2.22) (1.53)
N 217 217
∗p<0.05, ∗∗p<0.01,∗∗∗ p<0.001
Among all the personality variables tested, only extraversion was significant in 
explaining the likelihood of a round being funded. Two measures of the extraversion of the 
group, the mean and minimum, were significant, as shown in Table 3. That the minimum level 
of extraversion would be associated with whether a round gets funded is commensurate with our 
hypothesis. If we picture Schelling’s mobilisation curve shown above (Figure 2), it seems that 
extraversion (or possibly a combination of extraversion and agreeableness) correlates with the 
‘willingness to join’ the movement (the x-axis). Those high in extraversion are so willing to join 
that they start. Those with more moderate levels of extraversion have a medium threshold to 
join. Those with low levels of extraversion have a very low willingness to join, and too high a 
proportion of these individuals hamper the possible success of a movement. A high minimum 
value for any given round suggests that there are lower numbers of people with higher 
thresholds, which seems to be associated with a higher likelihood of a round being funded. 
Mean extraversion was also significant, suggesting again that generally high numbers of 
extravert people in a group is associated with a higher chance of a round being funded. We did 
not, however, find similar results for internal locus of control. Similarly, the minimum, 
maximum and mean levels of agreeableness (and all the other personality variables) were not 
associated with the likelihood of a round being funded.
Discussion
We have identified heterogeneity in our experimental subjects in their willingness to join a 
collective action at an early stage, when there is little or no evidence that other people will join 
or that the common goal is likely to be attained. That is, some people were willing to start a 
mobilisation more than once; some joined mobilisations only during the later stages; and most 
varied their behaviour across a middle range. We have also identified that for a proportion of 
subjects in our experiment, the rank (or willingness) at which they join is consistent, and we 
found most evidence of this consistency at the early and late stages of a mobilisation. That is, we 
identified some people with consistently low thresholds, and some with consistently high 
thresholds for joining. These findings confirm our first hypothesis, H1.
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We have identified the personality characteristics associated with low or high thresholds, 
although not for all the personality variables that we investigated in our analysis. Social value 
orientation, for example, seems to be unrelated to people’s propensity to start (rejecting H2b), in 
spite of the strong relationship between this variable and contribution behaviour identified by 
economists (Gachter et al., 2010). In contrast, internal locus of control is positively associated 
with a willingness to start, confirming H2a and supporting the findings of research in psychology 
and management on leadership (Anderson and Schneier, 1978; Spector, 1982; Gore and Rotter, 
1963; Carlson and Hyde, 1980; Guyton, 1988; Milbrath and Goel, 1977). 
Likewise, we find that extraversion is consistently associated with willingness to start, 
confirming H2c. This confirms evidence from political science that points to a relationship 
between extraversion and political participation (Mondak and Halperin, 2008; Gerber et al, 
2011). We might have expected that in online contexts where participants to not interact 
socially, such as the one we simulated here, extraversion would be less predictive (as Mondak et 
al, 2010 and Gerber et al, 2011 found for various ‘non-social’ types of participation), so the fact 
that it remained significant throughout our analysis renders this finding more interesting and 
suggests that this personality trait acts endogenously to predispose individuals to start or initiate 
action even when there is no indication that others will do so. The positive association we found 
between the concentration of extraversion in a subject group, and the likelihood of a round 
getting funded, suggesting that a mobilisation with lower numbers of people with low 
extraversion (and conversely, higher numbers of people with higher levels of extraversion) has a 
higher chance of success, reinforces this finding.  
We have made the additional finding that agreeableness is positively associated with a 
tendency to go late, suggesting that agreeable people wait until it is clear that the mobilisation 
will be funded (that is, that more than half the necessary number have contributed) before 
joining themselves. This comports with the mixed results of previous research for this 
personality trait; agreeable people seem drawn to some types of participation and not to other, 
more conflictual activities; starting an action where there are few other participants could fall 
into this category, confirming the importance of context and ‘personality-dependent 
characteristics of each participatory act’ (Gerber et al, 2011). None of the other ‘Big 5’ 
personality variables investigated are significantly associated with threshold, a result that joins 
the mixed results for these traits in most previous political science research (Mondak, 2010; 
Mondak and Halperin, 2008; Vecchione and Caprara, 2009; and Gerber et al, 2011). 
These findings also support previous research on leadership (Lord et al., 1986; Gough, 
1990; Judge et al., 2002) finding that the ‘Big 5’ typology is a fruitful basis for examining 
predictors of leadership and that extraversion is the most consistent correlate of leadership 
(Judge et al., 2002). This previous research focused on leadership in organisations, whereas our 
findings for extraversion in the different context of collective action are stronger and less 
equivocal. It may be that the strength of our results derive from extraversion being best suited to 
the starting element of leadership, and less so to the other activities required for leading in 
offline contexts, which require other dimensions of personality.
The research design employed here indicates potential for laboratory experiments to 
investigate the relationship between personality and collective action and joins a growing body 
of experimental research in political science. As suggested above, online (as opposed to offline) 
participation may be easier to simulate in a laboratory setting, but the design used here had still 
to tackle the usual external validity problems of such experiments. The next phase of this 
research will move towards using an internet-based environment, where online participation 
may be more accurately simulated, yet the information environment can be more easily 
manipulated and randomised than in a normal field experiment. However, the challenge of 
administering a personality questionnaire in a field setting limits the potential for using the 
internet as a ‘field’ in this way, suggesting that a micro-labour platform such as Amazon 
Mechanical Turk could be the most viable solution, with an ‘internet-as-laboratory’ 
experimental design (Margetts and Stoker, 2010; Margetts et al, 2011).
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Conclusion
We started with the puzzle that most online mobilisations do not succeed, while a very few do. 
We aimed to identify a mechanism that distinguishes the successful ones. Analysis of large-
scale transactional data from electronic petitions suggests that the early days of a mobilisation 
are crucial; success is reliant on a significant number of people being willing to act at this early 
point, when there is no social information to indicate viability. Those who participate in the 
early moments set off a chain of reactions—giving an indication of support to others with harder 
criteria for joining, who in turn, by joining, give a similar indication to those with harder criteria 
and so on—that results in some mobilisations reaching a critical mass or tipping point. The 
mechanism that sets off this chain reaction is based on differential thresholds among potential 
participants; some people are willing to go early, which satisfies the criteria of those whose 
threshold is a little higher and so on, as in Schelling’s model. In online settings, where people 
can be rapidly notified of new mobilisations through large-scale social networks, and social 
information is readily available, such a chain of events can happen very quickly; likewise, a 
movement may fail almost immediately as news of the mobilisation slips down the news feed on 
social media platforms, and the starting moment is lost. By identifying heterogeneous 
thresholds, consistent at least at the higher and lower end, we have provided some evidence for 
this mechanism in action. 
In this environment, leadership is the aggregate of many low-cost actions undertaken by 
those willing to start, rather than the raft of actions and characteristics of the few with which it is 
normally associated. Of course, the group of starters will usually include at least one leader 
more in the traditional mould who has taken a higher cost action; for example, the person who 
sets up a petition and circulates it to close associates in their immediate social networks. But the 
number of starters needed to get the mobilisation off the ground will be beyond that which could 
be obtained with strong ties to the initiator alone, but will be attained with weak ties, such as the 
friend of a friend of a friend on a social networking site, or the retweet of the retweet of a tweet. 
To obtain the 500 signatures used as a measure of success for the petitions in the analysis in the 
introduction, the initiator of a petition would have to go beyond their immediate social network; 
in 2011, the median number of friends on Facebook was 100 (Backstrom, 2011) and the median 
number of followers on Twitter was 85 (Bakshy et al., 2011). At this point, the raw information 
of how many signatures have been obtained will be a relatively important piece of social 
information, rather than the network attachment to the initiator. Many petitions on similar issues 
fail while one might succeed; it is not the existence of the leader who brings the success, but the 
existence of a sufficient number of starters with low thresholds, and the readily available and 
disseminated social information about other participants that draws in the followers with higher 
thresholds. By providing this social information, Internet-based platforms circumvent the need 
for other activities traditionally performed by leaders.
If extraversion is a good predictor of low threshold, then the likelihood of a mobilisation 
obtaining some measure of success will depend in part on the distribution of extraversion in the 
pool of people who ascribe importance to the issue at hand and are aware of the mobilisation. A 
possible corollary of this finding is that mobilizations initiated by people with high levels of 
extraversion are more likely to succeed. Given that we might hypothesise that extravert people 
tend to select extravert friends (Selfhout et al, 2010), evidence to suggest that extravert people 
have more friends on social media (Amichai-Haurger and Vinitzky, 2010; Moore and McElroy, 
2012) and that an individual is most likely to kick off a mobilisation via their own online social 
networks, then an extravert’s initiative will be immediately disseminated to a pool of people 
with greater than normal levels of extraversion and, if our findings are correct, low thresholds 
for joining. 
The earlier work by Schelling and Granovetter discussed in the first section assumed that 
different individuals have different thresholds and based their models on this assumption. They 
did not investigate why individuals have the thresholds that they do, or what types of people 
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have which types of threshold. In contrast, we have looked at the characteristics of people with 
low thresholds, and identified a relationship between extraversion (and, to a less clear extent, 
internal locus of control) and low thresholds. From the evidence reported here, we cannot 
attempt to make any claims here as to what the distribution of thresholds might be in any given 
context as our findings are based on experimental data that did not purport to be a representative 
sample of any population. However, these findings suggest that future research aimed at 
understanding the distribution of thresholds might include secondary analysis of research into 
the distribution of extraversion or locus of control in different populations. 
These findings also have a wider significance. The argument presented here suggests that 
contemporary political mobilisations can become viable without leading individuals and 
organisations to undertake organisation and co-ordination costs, proceeding to critical mass and 
even achieving the policy or political change at which they are aimed. Simplistically, it could be 
argued that this is the case with some of the uprisings of the Arab spring, where dictators and 
their administrative apparatus were toppled without institutions, political parties or embryonic 
leaders in the wings to undertake the process of rebuilding the state. Single-issue mobilisations 
that attain critical mass but have no interest group or social enterprise behind them will find it 
hard to generate sustainable policy change. In this context, understanding the dynamics of these 
collective actions based on micro-donations of resources becomes increasingly important.  
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